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Measuring BGP AS Path Looping (BAPL) and Private AS Number
Leaking (PANL)
Shenglin Zhang, Ying Liu , Dan Pei, and Baojun Liu
Abstract: As a path vector protocol, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) messages contain an entire Autonomous
System (AS) path to each destination for breaking arbitrary long AS path loops. However, after observing the global
routing data from RouteViews, we find that BGP AS Path Looping (BAPL) behavior does occur and in fact can lead
to multi-AS forwarding loops in both IPv4 and IPv6. The number and ratio of BAPLs in IPv4 and IPv6 on a daily
basis from August 1, 2011 to August 31, 2015 are analyzed. Moreover, the distribution of BAPLs among duration
and loop length in IPv4 and IPv6 are also studied. Several possible explanations for BAPL are discussed in this
paper. Private AS Number Leaking (PANL) has contributed to 0.20% of BAPLs in IPv4, and at least 1.76% of
BAPLs in IPv4 were attributed to faulty configurations and malicious attacks. Valid explanations, including networks
of multinational companies, preventing particular AS from accepting routes, also can lead to BAPLs. Motivated by
the large number of PANLs that contribute to BAPLs, we also study the number and the ratio of PANLs per day in
the 1492 days. The distribution of the private AS numbers in all of the PANLs is concentrated, and most of them
are located in the source of the AS paths. The majority of BAPLs resulted from PANLs endure less than one day,
and the number of BAPLs which are caused by two or more leaked private ASes are much larger than that of
BAPLs which are caused by one leaked private AS. We explain for this phenomenon and give some advices for the
operators of ASes.
Key words: forwarding loops; BGP AS path; private AS number; RouteViews; traceroute
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Introduction

The Internet consists of thousands of Autonomous
Systems (ASes) that are defined as a connected group
of one or more IP prefixes governed by a specific
and clearly defined routing policy[1] . At least one
intra-domain routing protocol is deployed in an AS to
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optimize routing within the domain, such as OSPF[2] ,
RIP[3] , and IS-IS[4] . The reachability information
among ASes can be exchanged with the inter-domain
protocol called Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)[5] .
Each BGP route contains an AS path attribute that lists
the path of ASes used to reach the prefix.
BGP is supposed to eliminate path looping. When an
AS receives a BGP routing update, it will check whether
the AS path attribute contains its own AS number. If so,
it will discard this BGP routing message immediately to
break the AS path loops. As described in RFC 4271[5] ,
“this information (the AS path attribute) is sufficient
to construct a graph of AS connectivity from which
routing loops may be pruned.”
Despite BGP’s design intention of preventing AS
path loops, previous research has proved the occurrence
of BGP AS Path Looping (BAPL)[6–8] . A BAPL occurs
if there is a loop exists in the AS path attribute.
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Specifically, we suppose that there are n ASes in
the AS path, and the BGP AS path vector from the
source AS pn to the destination AS p1 is defined
as asp D .p1 ; p2 ; :::; pn /. A BAPL happens if pi D
pj ; j > i; j
i ¤ 1. Although previous studies
have been conducted on BAPL, this topic has not been
systematically investigated. Thus, in the current paper,
we conduct a systematic study on BAPL using real BGP
and traceroute data, covering the following important
aspects of BAPL.
Relationship between BAPL and forwarding
looping. The BGP AS path denotes the list of ASes
through which the BGP update messages propagate,
while the forwarding AS path is the list of ASes that
actually propagate the data packets.
Previous studies have shown that inter-domain
forwarding loops exist in the Internet[9, 10] . In theory,
BAPL can potentially cause forwarding loops. If
BAPL contributes to multi-AS forwarding loops, then
analyzing the distribution of BAPL behavior and
studying its possible causes can help us understand how
to reduce loop-induced transmission delay and packet
loss[11, 12] , and to prevent attackers from interrupting
the Internet[13] . However, whether a BAPL can cause
real forwarding loops in reality has not been studied;
therefore, it is an aspect that we examine in this paper.
Our observation verifies that a small fraction of BAPLs
(approximately 1%) can cause inter-domain forwarding
loops.
Characteristics of BAPL. We observed that there
were more than 21 900 BAPL updates occuring for IPv4
per day and more than 3800 for IPv6 on average. The
majority (more than 74%) of the loops in IPv6 lasted
shorter than one day, while a non-trivial number of
BAPL updates lasted longer than a month. Two-AS
loops and three-AS loops dominated the loop length
distribution.
Potential causes of BAPL. We show that BAPL may
occur for a few valid reasons, such as networks of
multinational companies and preventing particular AS
from accepting routes. In addition, Private AS Number
Leaking (PANL) contributed to 0.20% of BAPLs in
IPv4. BAPLs caused by invalid reasons (PANL, faulty
configurations, and intentional attacks) should be fixed
by network operators in case that they lead to interdomain forwarding loops.
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
has reserved the AS numbers (64 512–65 535) for
private use, and thus private AS numbers should not
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be propagated on the global Internet[1] . However,
previous studies have demonstrated that PANL exists
in the Internet[10] . A PANL occurs if a private AS
number exists in the AS path attribute. Specifically, as
described in the definition of asp, if 9i 2 Œ1; n; pi 2
Œ65 512; 65 535, then a PANL occurs. The large
number of PANLs that contribute BAPLs motivates us
to investigate PANL in the following aspects.
(1) Characteristics of PANL. On average, more than
5900 PANL updates occur per day in IPv4 and more
than 1900 in IPv6. We also observed that private AS
numbers are most likely located in the source of the
AS path, demonstrating that faulty configuration is
the major cause of PANL. In addition, more than
62.3% of the PANLs are contributed by five private
AS numbers, which is prone to conflicts when BGP
routers select private AS numbers as their next
ASes.
(2) Relationship between BAPL and PANL. The
majority of the BAPLs brought about by PANLs
endure less than a day, and the number of BAPLs
that result from the condition in which two or
more private ASes do not check the BGP AS path
(hereafter, collectively referred to as type2 BAPL)
are much larger than that of BAPLs that result from
one private AS. We illustrate the explanations of
type2 BAPLs and provide advice to the operators of
ASes.
A preliminary version of this work was previously
published[14] . The current paper presents several new
results, including (1) extension of the study on PANL
and (2) discussion of the relationship between BAPLs
and PANLs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Previous studies related to BAPL are summarized in
Section 2. Section 3 describes the data sets and
methodology used in this study. Section 4 discusses
the relationship between BAPL and forwarding loops.
Section 5 presents the BAPL characteristics. Section
6 provides the explanations of BAPL. Section 7 shows
the measurement of PANL, and Section 8 discusses
the relationship between PANL and BAPL in depth.
Section 9 concludes our work and discusses the future
research.

2

Related Work

Several studies have been conducted on routing loops,
but few of them have focused on BAPL behavior or on
the relationship between BAPL and forwarding looping.
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Some studies have focused on forwarding AS path
loops or forwarding routing loops. For example, Paxson
has studied routing loops using end-to-end traceroute
measurements collected in 1994 and 1995[15] . Although
this paper focused on persistent loops, it found a few
transient loops and conjectured that such loops were
due to link failure information. Mao et al.[10] believed
that some ASes did not broadcast their infrastructure
addresses and others could announce the addresses of
shared equipment at border points between ASes, which
led to some forwarding AS path loops in traceroute. Xia
et al.[9] presented a measurement study on persistent
forwarding loops, and analyzed the possibility of
flooding attacks that exploited persistent forwarding
loops. They performed extensive measurements to
study persistent forwarding loops, and found that
persistent loops across multiple ASes did exist on the
Internet. Traceroute was also used for measurement in
the study, which showed that 0.2% of routable addresses
were found to experience persistent forwarding loops.
Nevertheless, loop detection only using end-to-end
tools such as traceroute is error-prone and cannot
successfully detect transient loops[11] .
Pei et al.[16] investigated transient BGP path vector
route looping behavior. They analyzed the cause of
transient BAPL behavior theoretically and explained
how AS path loops would form and resolve and how
long they would last. This paper believes that routing
updates are slowed down by delays because of physical
constraints and protocol mechanisms. Therefore, the
inconsistent routing information on different nodes
leads to AS path loops during convergence, which
depends on the ability of each node to choose an
alternative path without loops. The Minimum Route
Advertisement Interval (MRAI) is the main factor in the
duration of transient AS path loops. Furthermore, Weitz
et al.[17] proposed a bagpipe system to verify the BGP
configuration. Methods of detection of BGP AS path
loops have been studied by Refs. [18,19]. Moreover, the
private AS number leaking in BGP AS path information
has also been mentioned by Refs. [20–23].
Mahajan et al.[7] presented an example of BAPL:
a key AS of Internet introduced BAPL intentionally
to achieve several strategies, while this behavior
was unnecessary for most operators of BGP routers.
Similarly, Shi et al.[6] , Javed et al.[24] , and Katz-Bossett
et al.[25] also introduced an instance for BAPL caused by
intentional configuration: the University of Washington
and Georgia Institute of Technology conducted out a
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rerouting experiment that applied to AS 47065 and led
to BAPLs.
Different from previous studies, the current paper
focuses on the distribution and causes of both
transient and persistent BAPL behaviors. To avoid the
disadvantage of measurement using only traceroute, we
have conducted out our measurement study on BAPL
using both RouteViews[26] and traceroute[27] .

3

Data Sets and Methodology

The forwarding AS path denotes the list of ASes
traversed by data packets. BGP AS path, also called
signaling AS path, represents the list of ASes that
propagate the BGP update messages. For example,
as Fig. 1 shows, ASa, which has a destination p,
propagates the BGP update message to ASd through
ASb and ASc, and then (ASd, ASc, ASb, ASa) is ASd’s
BGP signaling AS path to destination p. Meanwhile,
ASd forwards packets to destination p in ASa along
the path of ASd, ASc, ASb, ASa, and then (ASd, ASc,
ASb, ASa) is ASd’s forwarding AS path to destination
p. However, these two types of AS paths are not
always identical due to various reasons, such as route
aggregation/filtering and forwarding anomalies[10, 28] .
To collect the forwarding AS paths, we employ
traceroute[29] , which is widely used to observe
routing problems and discover the underlying network
topology. In traceroute, the interfaces on a forwarding
path are identified and the round-trip time statistics for
each hop along the way are reported. This approach
is considered as the only effective way to observe
how packets pass through the Internet under the
circumstance of no access to private routing data. To
improve our understanding of the relationship between
BAPL and forwarding looping behavior, we follow the
methodology presented in Ref. [10] and measure the
AS a

p

ASb
(AS a)
(AS b, AS a)

( ASd, ASc, ASb, ASa)
(AS c, ASb, AS a)
ASd

BGP AS path

Fig. 1
path.

AS c
Fowarding AS path

An example of BGP AS path and forwarding AS
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signaling AS path and forwarding AS path at the same
time. When a forwarding AS loop is identical to the
signaling AS path loop, we consider that the forwarding
AS loop is attributed to BAPL.
Each BGP node announces its best paths to all
destinations to its neighbors, and records the most
recent paths received from all of its neighbors. BGP
advertises the route to each destination only once, and
sends subsequent updates only upon route changes.
Consecutive updates for the same destination are spaced
out by M seconds (default value 30) using an MRAI.
When a current path to a destination is no longer
available, the BGP router will attempt to find an
alternative path by checking all the saved paths it
learned from its neighbors previously. If no alternative
path exists, the router will send an explicit path
withdrawal message to its neighbors.
To obtain the signaling AS path used in this study,
we collect data from the publicly available Oregon
RouteViews route-views4 collector[26] , which gathers
BGP data from its geographically distributed AS peers
(sometimes also called monitors)) for both IPv4 and
IPv6.
The route-views4 collector dumps snapshots of the
BGP routing table (RIB) for each of its peers every two
hours in the Multi-threaded Routing Toolkit (MRT)[29]
format. In addition, the collector receives BGP routing
updates from its peers, and writes the collected BGP
routing updates into files every 15 minutes in the MRT
format[30] . BGP RIB and updates both contain attributes
such as timestamp, peer IP, peer AS, prefix, AS path,
and origin AS. Among these attributes, the AS path
attribute is the signaling AS path, and we use it to
analyze BAPLs and PANLs. The timestamp in the RIB
is the time when the snapshot is dumped, while the
timestamp in the update is the time when the update is
received from a peer.
We collect the RIB data at 00:00:00 on August 1,
2011 and the BGP update data from RouteViews in
1492 days from August 1, 2011 to August 31, 2015.
Based on the RIB data and the update data, we obtained
the routing table at anytime during the period. When
a new update appears, a corresponding record will be
added to the routing table. A record may be removed
from the routing table as a result of a withdrawal or a
different update.

4

BAPL May Lead to Forwarding Loops

In general, a packet from the source traverses a
sequence of routers to reach the destination. A packet
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experiences a forwarding loop if it traverses a set of
routers more than once. Studies have shown that
forwarding loops can cause packets in the loops with
higher loss rate and longer delay. Other packets that
traverse one or more links in the loop, could have
longer delay and higher jitters due to the resource
consumption caused by the looping packets[11, 12] . Such
a vulnerability can be exploited by attackers to overload
the shared links to disrupt the Internet connectivity to
certain victim destination addresses or prefixes[13] .
Xia et al.[9] and Mao et al.[10] have shown that multiAS forwarding loops existed in the Internet. Will BAPL
contribute to multi-AS forwarding loops? We suppose
that BAPL may lead to inter-domain forwarding loops,
and then analyzing the distributions and explanations of
BAPL behavior will help to prevent part of forwarding
looping, thereby reducing packet loss rate, preventing
attackers from disrupting the Internet, and decreasing
link utilization and corresponding delay.
We conducted case studies to analyze whether the
BAPLs we have observed can actually cause forwarding
AS path loops or not. We tried to find a RouterView
peer AS among the observed BAPLs who had a looking
glass router that allowed us to run traceroute toward the
destination prefix. For example, on September 8, 2013,
using RouteViews[26] , we observed a signaling AS path
(AS1299, AS6453, AS577, AS7788, AS6407, AS7788)
destined for prefix 64.26.148.0/24 in the RIB entry
for the monitor 80.91.255.62 (from AS1299), and this
BAPL lasted more than a few days. The traceroute[27]
resulted from 80.91.255.62 (which happened to be a
looking glass router) to 64.26.148.28 (an IP address in
the destination prefix) witnessed a forwarding loop as
shown in Table 1. Using the method introduced in Ref.
[10], we converted the router-level forwarding path into
a forwarding AS path, which turned out to be identical
to the signaling AS path. In particular, the forwarding
AS loop was identical to the BGP AS path loop.
Moreover, we repeated the preceding experiments
and found that only 1% of the signaling loop accounted
for forwarding loops. This percentage might be biased
because we only sampled the signaling loops in which
we could use the looking glass router to run traceroute.
Nevertheless, our findings show that BAPL behavior
could indeed cause inter-domain forwarding loops. This
observation motivates us to conduct further in-depth
investigation of BAPL behavior in the rest of this
paper.
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5

Measurement of BAPL

Studies have shown that BAPLs exist on the
Internet[6, 7, 24, 25] , but the scale of BAPLs in IPv4 and
IPv6 remains unclear. We used to believe that all of
BAPLs were caused by misconfigurations. However,
Xia et al.[9] observed a great many persistent forwarding
AS path loops that may be caused by persistent BAPLs.
Moreover, we want to know the distribution among the
duration of BAPLs and the explanations for persistent
BAPLs. As BAPLs may lead to forwarding AS path
looping, and the loop length is important for attackers
to amplify the traffic in the forwarding links, the
distribution of BAPL loop length is also studied in this
paper.
5.1

Fig. 2

daily basis from August 1, 2011 to August 31, 2015.
Figure 2b shows the number and ratio of BAPLs in
IPv6. Overall, 32 712 387 BAPLs have been observed
in IPv4 and 5 563 527 in IPv6 during 1492 days.
The medians of the number and ratio of BAPLs for
each year in IPv4 and IPv6 are listed in Table 2. The
median of the number for each year is the median
number of the set of BAPL numbers per day, and the
median of the ratio for a certain year is the median ratio
of the set of BAPL ratios on a daily basis. The number
of BAPLs increased dramatically from 2011 to 2014
in IPv4 and decreased in 2015. Due to the explosion

Total number and ratio of BAPLs

We define a BAPL as a BGP update, the BGP AS path
of which includes an AS path loop. With the daily
BGP update data described in Section 3, the number of
BAPLs per day is counted.
Figure 2a shows the number of BAPLs and the ratio
of the number for BAPLs to the number of all of the
BGP updates collected by RouteViews in IPv4 on a

(b) IPv6
The number and the ratio of BAPLs.

Table 2
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Number
of IPv4
4866
5431
18 249
28 810
16 405

Medians of BAPLs per year.
Ratio
of IPv4
9:28  10
1:06  10
2:70  10
2:84  10
1:26  10

4
3
3
3
3

Number
of IPv6
13
17
27
983
189

Ratio
of IPv6
3:55  10
5:99  10
5:78  10
8:76  10
9:33  10

5
5
5
4
5

Ratio of BAPLs in IPv6

0.25
Number
Ratio

07/01/12

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

01/01/12

AS number
1299
1299
1299
1299
1299
1299
6453
6453
6453
6453
6453
6453
577
7788
7788
6407
7788
7788
6407
7788
7788
6407
...

-1

6

07/01/11

Router address
213.155.133.147
213.155.133.142
213.155.130.51
80.91.249.29
213.155.131.139
213.248.100.178
63.243.128.42
64.86.85.1
216.6.87.9
216.6.98.58
64.86.85.1
216.6.98.58
67.69.218.3
209.217.64.37
206.191.0.89
67.230.128.70
209.217.64.37
206.191.0.89
67.230.128.70
209.217.64.37
206.191.0.89
67.230.128.70
...

10

Number of BAPLs in Ipv4

Hop
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
...

An example of traces that contains forwarding

4

Table 1
loops.

Number of BAPLs in Ipv6 (×10 )
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of the global BGP routing table, the ratio of BAPLs
remained stable in 2012 and 2014, and witnessed a rapid
growth in 2013 and a dramatic decrease in 2015. In
IPv6, the number of BAPLs remained stable in 2012
and 2013, increased rapidly in 2014, and decreased
sharply in 2015, as well as the ratio. The rapid increase
in 2014 may have resulted from faulty configurations,
with the BAPLs alive for a long time (shown in Fig. 3
and Fig. 2b). As a result, in 2014, the medians of BAPL
quantity in IPv4 and IPv6 are higher than those in 2013
and 2015.
The deployment scale of IPv6 is much smaller than
that of IPv4, and most of the facilities in IPv6 are
deployed later than those in IPv4. Incidents such
as faulty configurations, malicious attacks, and other
potential causes discussed in Section 6 occur much less
frequently in IPv6 than those in IPv4. As a result, the
number and ratio of BAPLs in IPv6 are much smaller
than those in IPv4.
Duration of BAPLs

We also studied the duration of BAPL with the BGP
update data (defined in Section 3). As described in the
preceding sections, a BGP entry can be removed from
the routing table due to a withdrawal or a new update.
We define the duration of a BAPL as the time interval
between its announcement and its withdrawal or a new
replacement announcement without the same AS path.
For a BGP RIB entry, the duration is the period from
00:00:00 on August 1, 2011 to the time when the entry
is withdrawn or replaced with a different update.
The persistence of the BAPLs is studied. Figure 3
shows the Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) of
the distribution of duration for BAPLs in IPv4 and IPv6.
That is, 32 712 364 out of 32 275 791 (98.64%) BAPLs
in IPv4 and 4 146 789 out of 5 563 518 (74.53%) BAPLs
in IPv6 last shorter than one day. These short-lived
BAPLs could be attributed to configuration faults or

5.3
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Fig. 3
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CDF of BAPLs duration.
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7

CDF of BAPL duration (IPv6)

95

Loop length of BAPLs

As discussed, BAPLs may lead to multi-AS forwarding
loops. AS path loops and forwarding paths may share
one or more links to the destination prefixes or
addresses. An attacker can use BAPLs to overload
the shared links to interrupt the connectivity with those
reachable prefixes or addresses[13] .
The length of an AS path loop is important for
the traffic amplification in the links. When a packet
enters an AS path loop, the packet may traverse the
links in the loop several times before its TTL expires.
Obviously, the shorter the loop length is, the more
times the packet will spend to traverse the links in the
loop. Since the BGP AS path vector from pn to p1 is
asp D .pn ; pn 1 ; :::; p1 /, by definition, pi D pj ; j >
i; j i ¤ 1 for a BAPL, and the loop length of asp is
j i . Figure 4 shows loop length distribution of BAPLs
in IPv4 and IPv6. The number of the BAPLs of AS
path loop length l for a certain year denotes the number
of different RIB entries or updates that contain looped
AS path with the loop length l in the year. Obviously,
the bulk of BAPLs had 2-hop or 3-hop loops for both
IPv4 and IPv6, which facilitates amplification of the
amount of traffic remarkably to destination addresses in
the links that appear in the loops.
As RFC 4271[5] describes, BAPL should not occur
in any case, but our observation shows the large scale
of BAPLs in both IPv4 and IPv6. We previously

100

100
CDF of BAPL duration (IPv4)

malicious attacks. In IPv4, the longest duration is 669
days (until 24:00 on August 31 2015), while in IPv6,
the duration is 1260 days (until 24:00 on August 31,
2015).
The result is beyond our expectations. We previously
expected that fault configuration was the only factor that
led to BAPL behavior. Were it true, BAPL should last
shorter than what we have observed. We discuss this
problem in Section 6.
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believed that misconfiguration was the only explanation
for BAPL, and all BAPLs should be transient, while
our observation shows that a large number of BAPLs
last longer than one day. Furthermore, most BAPLs
have a 2-hop or 3-hop loop, which is easily exploited
by attackers who overload the links.

6

Explanations of BAPL

A few possible causes can lead to BAPL such as
deployment of routing policies, route experiments,
PANL, networks of multinational companies, faulty
configuration, and intentional attacks.
6.1

Multinational companies

Some multinational companies have exchange points
all over the world, and several exchange points may
share the same AS number, where operators configure
their Customer Edge (CE) routers to accept routes of
which the AS path attributes contain their own AS
number[31] . When BGP routing updates pass through
exchange points with the same AS number but locate
in different countries, they may also go through
one or more ASes among the exchange points. It
appears as if the BGP updates the loop in the AS
path from the BGP perspective. For example, NTT
Communications Corporation[32] has exchange points
in Frankfurt, Tokyo, and several cities in the United
States, which share the same AS number, 2914. When
the prefix in ASx propagates the BGP updates to
ASy (ASx and ASy represent independent AS.), as
Fig. 5 illustrates, the message passes through the
exchange point of NTT in Chicago and Frankfurt. If
the BGP router of the exchange point in Frankfurt
computes the degree of preference of the route based on
preconfigured policy information, and does not discard
the routing updates of which the AS path attributes
contain AS2914, a BAPL (ASx , AS2914, ASb, ..., ASa,
AS2914, ASy ) from the BGP perspective occurs.

Chicago

ASa

ASb

AS
2914

AS
2914

ASx

ASy

Fig. 5

Frankfurt

Multinational companies.

6.2

Preventing particular AS from accepting
routes

Some BGP operators prepend to an AS path to
keep other providers from picking up the routes. For
example, the BGP operator of AS 3066 wanted to send
routes to Sprint (AS1239)[33] that were not to be picked
up by UUnet/Verizon Business (AS701)[34] , so the path
(AS3066, AS701) was prepended to the AS path[8] .
When the BGP routing updates containing the AS path
vector (AS1239, AS3066, AS701, AS3066) arrived to
AS701, AS701 discards the message immediately and
no relative traffic traverses AS701. As a result, a BAPL
(AS1239, AS3066, AS701, AS3066) was propagated
on the Internet. The BAPL was artificially injected by
the operator of AS3066, which would not lead to any
forwarding loop.
Similarly, on August 18, 2011, the University of
Washington and the Georgia Institute of Technology
conducted a rerouting experiment that applied
AS47065[6, 24, 25] . In this experiment, a looped AS
path (47065, x, 47065) for prefix 184.164.255.0/24
was announced, so that ASx could not accept this route
later, and related traffic would not pass through ASx.
Obviously, the prepense configuration of the network
operator on BGP routers can lead to BAPLs that do not
account for any forwarding loop.
Zebra[35] is a well-known tool used for conducting
BGP route experiments. The operators can turn a server
into a full-powered router with Zebra, and change the
configurations dynamically using the terminal interface.
Specifically, with the help of Zebra, the operators can
filter AS paths, and modify any attribute of the BGP
update including the BGP AS path.
6.3

Private AS number leaking

The IANA has reserved the AS numbers (65 512–
65 535) for private use and private AS numbers should
not to be advertised on the global Internet[1] . However,
we have observed a large number of AS paths that
contain private AS numbers. As explained by Mao
et al.[10] , when a customer who uses a private AS
number mistakenly leaks BGP routes learned from one
upstream provider to another, an AS path containing the
private AS number may arise. Some private AS number
leaking events even account for BAPLs, which is quite
beyond our expectations. As described in the definition
of asp, the context where BAPLs are caused by private
AS number leaking can be described as pi D pj ; j >
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Total number and ratio of PANL

We define a PANL as a BGP update whose AS path
includes a private AS number. We count the number of
PANLs per day based on the BGP update data described
in Section 3. Figure 7a shows the number and ratio of
the number of PANLs to the number of all BGP updates
collected by RouteViews in IPv4 on a daily basis from
August 1, 2011 to August 31, 2015. Figure 7b shows
the number and ratio of PANLs in IPv6.
According to Fig. 7, PANLs have been in the global
network for a long time. The spikes in Fig. 7 indicate
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7.1
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BAPLs can also arise when a BGP router incorrectly
reserves routing updates of which the AS path attributes
contain the local AS number. This condition could
occur because of configuration errors or even malicious
attacks.
Argus[36] is an agile system to detect prefix hijacking
and other anomalies caused by misconfigurations or
malicious attacks; this system has been collecting
data since June 1, 2011. After cross checking the
RouteViews data described in Section 3 and the
data collected from Argus, we found that in IPv4,
at least 170 036 out of 5 973 568 (2.85%) BAPLs
were associated with prefix hijacking or other routing
anomalies from June 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013.
These prefix hijacking and routing anomalies could be
attributed to faulty configurations or intentional attacks,
which means that at least 2.85% of BAPLs were caused
by misconfigurations or malicious attacks.
As we have stated, several valid factors can contribute
to BAPLs, such as multinational cooperation and
preventing particular AS from accepting routes, while
other BAPLs can be attributed to invalid reasons, such
as misconfigurations and intentional attacks, which
contributed to at least 2.85% of BAPLs in IPv4.

As we have explained, private AS numbers have been
reserved for private use and should not be advertised
on the Internet. However, we found a large number
of AS paths that contain private AS numbers in the
measurement study of BAPL. PANLs may not only leak
the private information of ASes, but also fluctuate the
length of the BGP AS path. In addition, PANLs may
affect the BGP decisions. To the best of our knowledge,
no previous work has investigated PANL systematically.
Therefore, we discuss the characteristics of PANL in
this section.

07/01/11

Faulty configurations or malicious attacks

Measurement of PANL

Number of PANLs in Ipv6

6.4

7

Number of PANLs in Ipv6

i; j i ¤ 1; 8m 2 .i; j /; pm 2 Œ65 512; 65 535.
Specifically, in our observation, at least 66 156 out of
32 712 387 (0.20%) BAPLs are definitely caused by AS
number leaking in IPv4.
If an AS is requested to communicate with a single
provider using BGP, it can use a private AS number,
which is not used unless the routing policy between the
provider and the AS is not visible on the Internet. As
Fig. 6 shows, when the prefix in ASx propagates BGP
updates to ASy, the message passes through ASa and
ASp. ASp communicates with its single provider ASa
using a private AS number, and normally, the private
AS number should not be advertised on the Internet.
However, when the private AS number is leaked on the
Internet, the usual reason is misconfiguration, and then
an AS path loop (ASx , ASa, ASp, ASa, ASy ) from the
BGP perspective forms.
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Fig. 7

(b) IPv6
Number and the ratio of private AS number leaking.
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that the number of PANLs sometimes increase sharply
due to misconfigurations. We observed more than 5900
PANLs in IPv4 and more than 1900 PANLs in IPv6 per
day on average. The number of PANLs in IPv6 are
small compared with those in IPv4 in 2011 and 2012, as
well as the ratio of the number of PANLs to the number
of all BGP updates. The reason is that compared with
IPv4, the deployment scale of IPv6 is small and the
facilities of IPv6 are new. Misconfigurations and other
potential causes of PANLs occur more frequently in
IPv4 than in IPv6. As the scale of deployment of IPv6
increases and the IPv6 facilities continue to age, the
number of PANLs grew rapidly in 2014.
7.2

Distribution of private AS numbers in PANLs

Since the AS number is the only identifier to distinguish
one AS from others, a BGP router broadcasts the BGP
AS path by identifying the next hop AS number. If
the distribution of private AS numbers in PANLs is
concentrated, then PANL can result in BGP broadcast
disorders between ASes. As the example in Fig. 8a

AS y

AS w

ASa

ASc

ASv
ASb

Source AS

ASd

ASz

ASx

Non-private AS
Private AS

(a) Private AS numbers in PANLs are dispersed.

ASw

ASy

ASa

ASa

ASv
ASa

Source AS

shows, the non-private ASv is connected to 4 private
ASes, i.e., ASa, ASb, ASc, ASd. Although ASa is a
private AS, ASv is able to broadcast the AS path to
ASw because ASa is unique among the neighbor ASes
of ASv. However, if the private AS numbers of the
neighbor ASes of ASv are the same, as Fig. 8b shows,
ASv may not broadcast the BGP AS path to ASw
correctly because it may select the next hop incorrectly.
As Table 3 shows, five private AS numbers constitute
the majority of all the private AS numbers in PANLs,
which can lead to BGP AS path broadcast disorders.
Two main explanations account for the concentrated
distribution of private AS numbers in PANLs as
follows:
 Popular private AS numbers are frequently used
by operators. For example, AS65001, AS65000,
AS64777, AS65534, and AS65535 are likely used
because operators can easily remember these private
numbers. Therefore, these private AS numbers
appear frequently in PANLs.
 Intentional configurations of network operators.
Sometimes, the operators of ASx do not want to
forward packets freely, and the operators of ASx can
insert several same private AS numbers into the AS
path around ASx. Then, the AS path becomes a low
priority when the source AS tries to select an AS
path to forward packets. Therefore, fewer packets
are forwarded by the ASx. For example, the private
AS number AS65332 is inserted into multiple AS
paths and each AS path contains several AS65332.
This type of PANLs is due to operators intentional
configurations for business benefits.
7.3

Location of private AS numbers in PANLs

As explained in the configuration recommendations
by Cisco[37] , BGP routes should prohibit anomalous
AS paths that contain private AS numbers from being
announced to the Internet. In addition, according to
RFC 4271[5] , BGP routers should filter private AS
numbers in BGP updates that are announced from intradomains. As a result, a private AS number should never
be located at the source of an AS path. However, our

ASa

Table 3
ASx

Distribution of the private AS numbers in PANLs.

ASz

Non-private AS
Private AS

(b) Private AS numbers in PANLs are concentrated.
Fig. 8 Effect of the distribution of private AS numbers in
PANLs.

Amount
2 407 697
1 938 457
1 687 932
734 153
294 950

Private AS number
65 332
65 001
65 000
64 777
655 34

Percentage (%)
21:2
17:1
14:9
6:5
2:6
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Relationship Between PANL and BAPL

As mentioned, 66 156 BAPLs are caused by PANLs
from August 1, 2011 to August 31, 2015. The large
number motivates us to further study the relationship
between PANL and BAPL, and the characteristics of
BAPLs resulted from PANL.
8.1

Total number of BAPLs that result from
PANLs

The number of BAPLs caused by PANLs per day is
shown in Fig. 10. The large number of spikes in the
figure indicates that the BAPLs that result from PANLs
usually last for less than a day. We can infer that faulty
configurations or malicious attacks led to these PANLs
and then the PANLs led to BAPLs, and the operators

10 000
8000
6000
4000

Fig. 10

6

Number of PANLs (×10 )

01/01/16

07/01/15

mitigated the misconfigurations or attacks in a short
time.
Furthermore, to provide advice for network operators
to fix the aforementioned problem to avoid PANLs and
BAPLs, we investigate the possible fault configurations
that may result in PANLs and BAPLs.
8.2

Types of looping

We analyze the characteristics of the BAPLs that result
from PANLs. We find that two types of BAPLs result
from PANLs, and the complex type of BAPLs caused
by PANLs occur much more frequently.
The first type of BAPLs caused by PANLs (type1
BAPL) is shown in Fig. 11a. When the AS path (ASx,
ASa) is delivered to a private ASa, the routers of the
private ASa do not check whether ASa is in the AS path.
The routers add ASa to the AS path and then a looped
AS path (ASa, ASx, ASa) occurs.
Two or more private ASes do not check whether they
are in the AS path and can lead to the second type
of BAPLs that result from PANLs (type2 BAPL). As
Fig. 11b shows, ASa and ASb are both private ASes.
When the AS path (ASb, ASa) comes to private ASa,
the routers of the private ASa will not check whether
1
ASx
2
Non-private AS
Private AS

4

(a) Looping-1

3

3

2

1
ASa

1
0

01/01/15

Daily number of BAPLs resulted from PANLs.
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5

07/01/14

Date (M/D/Y)
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07/01/11

0

07/01/12

2000

01/01/12

Number of PANLs
lead to BAPLs

experiment results contradict this inference.
The distribution of the locations of private AS
numbers in PANLs is shown in Fig. 9. The location
of a private AS number in PANL indicates the number
of ASes between the first private AS number (counted
from the source AS number to the destination AS
number) and the source AS number of the BGP AS
path. As Fig. 9 shows, whether in IPv4 or in IPv6, the
majority of private AS numbers in PANLs are located at
the source of BGP AS paths.
As we have mentioned, the private AS number should
not appear in the source of a BGP AS path if all
of the configurations of the BGP routers are correct.
Therefore, we can conclude that the fault configuration
of the BGP routers is the major cause of PANL.
Overall, numerous PANLs occur every day, both in
IPv4 and in IPv6. In addition, the private AS numbers
in PANLs are concentrated, which can result in BGP
broadcast disorders. Most private AS numbers appear
in the source AS of the BGP AS path, demonstrating
that faulty configurations contribute to the majority of
PANLs.
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Fig. 9 Distribution of the locations of private AS numbers
in PANLs.
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Two types of BAPLs that are resulted from PANLs.
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ASa is in the AS path, and then the looped AS path
(ASa, ASb, ASa) will occur. When the looped AS path
(ASa, ASb, ASa) is delivered to private ASb, ASb will
not check whether ASb is in the AS path either, and a
more complex looped AS path (ASb, ASa, ASb, ASa)
will occur.
Figure 12 shows a more complicated version of type2
BAPL). When the BGP AS path (ASb, ASc, ASa) is
delivered to private ASa, the routers of private ASa
will not determine whether the AS path includes ASa.
The routers will add ASa to the AS path and deliver
the looped AS path (ASa, ASb, ASc, ASa) to ASb.
Similarly, the routers of ASb will deliver the looped AS
path (ASb, ASa, ASb, ASc, ASa) to ASd. In the end, a
looped BGP AS path (ASa, ASd, ASb, ASa, ASb, ASc,
ASa) occurs.
We can observe that the type2 BAPL usually include
multiple BGP AS links. If these BAPLs lead to
forwarding loops, and attackers use these loops to
overload the links to interrupt the connectivity, multiple
links will be affected in the type2 BAPL. In addition,
the type2 BAPL can generate a long AS path, thereby
wasting the storage resources of BGP routing tables.
From August 1, 2011 to August 31, 2015, we observed
63 755 type2 BAPLs. That is, 95.85% of BAPLs that
are induced by PANLs are type2 BAPLs. Therefore, we
intend to find how the type2 BAPL forms and how to
resolve it with a typical example.
8.3

Explanations of type2 BAPLs

The large number of type2 BAPLs motivates us to
investigate the causes behind them. The customer ASes
of a non-private AS typically use private AS numbers
to communicate with the provider AS, and the routing
policy between the provider AS and customer AS
should not be advertised to the Internet. However, if
the private AS numbers of two or more customer ASes
are visible within and outside the provider AS, BAPLs
are likely to happen.
For example, as Fig. 13 shows, ASa and ASb are
ASc

2

ASa

ASz
E1

E2

ASx

Fig. 13

ASy

Illustration of how type2 BAPLs form.

customer ASes whose provider AS are ASz. ASa
and ASb use private AS numbers to communicate with
the non-private AS ASz via non-BGP protocols such
as OSPF, and ASx and ASy are non-private ASes
connected with ASz via the BGP protocol. ASa and
ASb are advertised to the Internet via the BGP router
E1 and E2, respectively. After ASz advertises the BGP
AS path (ASz, ASx) to ASa via E1, ASa adds ASa to
the AS path and advertise the BGP AS path (ASa, ASz,
ASx) to ASb and ASz. Then ASb adds ASb to the AS
path and advertise the BGP AS path (ASb, ASa, ASz,
ASx) to ASa and ASz, and then ASa adds ASa to the
AS path and advertises the BGP AS path (ASa, ASb,
ASa, ASz, ASx) back to ASb because ASa does not
run the BGP protocol and check whether it is in the
AS path. Similarly, ASb will also advertise the BGP
AS path (ASb, ASa, ASb, ASa, ASz, ASx) to ASz and
ASa. Then, a type2 BAPL occurs.
The example shows that PANLs can easily result in
type2 BAPLs, which is consistent with our observations.
If the operators of ASes can strictly prohibit the private
AS number from being advertised to the Internet, or
make customers of ASes that use the private AS number
check whether they are in the BGP AS path, type2
BAPLs will be eliminated from the BGP AS path
table. Therefore, the size of the BGP AS table will
be reduced, and no link will be congested because of
attacks induced by BAPLs.
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Fig. 12

An example of complicated type2 BAPLs.

The BAPLs studied in this paper can be helpful in
understanding the operational behavior of BGP in both
IPv4 and IPv6. Motivated by this idea, we initially tried
to explore the relationship between BAPL behavior and
forwarding looping, but we found that only a small part
(approximately 1%) of BAPLs can lead to forwarding
loops. We have studied the global BGP routing data in
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1456 days and analyzed the number and ratio of BAPLs
in IPv4 and IPv6. In addition, the duration of BAPLs
and the distribution of loop length are also discussed
in this paper. Different from our initial expectations,
a nontrivial number of BAPLs lasts for more than one
month.
Furthermore, BAPL can be attributed to various
factors. Reasonable explanations, including routing
experiments, multinational cooperation, and preventing
particular AS from accepting routes, have also
contributed to BAPLs. BAPLs caused by invalid
reasons such as the deployment of routing policies,
PANL, and misconfigurations should be fixed.
The large number of PANLs that result in BAPLs
motivate us to conduct in-depth research on PANLs.
We have investigated the number and ratio of PANLs
per day from August 1, 2011 to August 31, 2015,
and found that the private AS numbers in all of the
PANLs are concentrated, which can lead to BGP AS
path advertising disorders. The fact that most private
AS numbers are located at the source AS of the BGP AS
path shows that misconfigurations are the main reasons
for PANLs.
We have studied the number of BAPLs that are
caused by PANLs per day, and classified them into two
types, type1 BAPL in which a single private AS leads to
BAPL, and type2 BAPL in which two or more private
ASes result in BAPL. We explain how type2 BAPL
forms, and provide suggestions to operators of ASes.
In the future, we plan to focus on the correlation
between BAPL behaviors and other BGP anomalies.
We are also interested in the effects of BAPL on Internet
routing instability.
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